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Abstract
Since independence in 1960, insecurity has been a feature of the Nigerian 
State as conf licts in different parts of the country have continued to make 
life insecure. In the Niger Delta, violence has been the bane of the region 
where conf licts have been occurring for over four decades. Beginning from 
the pre-colonial period, the region has witnessed a series of conf licts, which 
had their roots, initially in the protest against injustice, and in recent years 
in the quest for resource control. All efforts to resolve conf lict in the region 
failed until 2009 when amnesty was declared by the Yar’adua/Jonathan 
administration and some form of uneasy peace prevailed. However, seven 
years down the line, there is renewed militancy in the region and effort is 
once again geared towards finding lasting peace. This article assesses the 
efforts made by the Federal Government of Nigeria to address conf licts in 
the region from the early 1960s to date. It is based on a literature study and 
on the author’s knowledge of the issues in the Niger Delta. Findings from the 
work show that the Federal Government’s approach to resolving conf lict in 
the region has not been successful because it has not adequately addressed 
the issues that gave rise to the conf lict, and because of its emphasis on the 
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use of force. The article therefore recommends a Collective Non-violent 
Conf lict Management approach – involving a group of negotiators, both 
international and local, an international mediator, as well as all the parties 
to the conf lict – as the means for resolving conf lict in the region. There is 
no doubt that a viable resource conf lict strategy based on an alternative 
framework of multilateral cooperation is necessary for resolving and 
preventing a recurrence of future conf lict in the Niger Delta region. 
Keywords: conf lict, resource conf lict, conf lict resolution, insecurity, 
non-violence
Introduction
The Niger Delta region of Nigeria, located in the south-south zone of 
the country, is the region that produces oil – the lifeline of the Nigerian 
economy. Since 1956, when oil was discovered in commercial quantity in 
Oloibiri in present day Bayesa state, Hydrocarbon resources have been 
the engines for Nigeria’s economy, as oil provides 95% of Nigeria’s foreign 
exchange earnings and 80% of the government’s budgetary revenues 
(Davis 2010:1–2). According to the Nigerian National Petroleum Company, 
Nigeria’s oil production accounts for 8% of the Organisation of Petroleum 
Exporting Corporation’s (OPEC) total daily production and 3% of the 
world’s volume. However, the discovery of oil, which was expected to 
improve the lot of the communities where it is sourced, has become a curse 
rather than a blessing because of oil exploration activities and its attendant 
hazards, such as air and water pollution. This has led to the indigenous 
people demanding compensation as well as control of the oil wealth. 
This demand has led to a confrontation between activists and Multinational 
Oil Companies operating in the region as well as the Federal Government. 
The struggle which started as a peaceful protest metamorphosed into 
armed conf lict after the killing of a renowned activist and playwright 
in the region, Ken Sara-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni men. The new wave 
of protests after this has included the abduction of foreign oil workers, 
bombing of oil installations and destruction of lives and property.
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In 2009, the Federal Government interceded with an amnesty programme 
under former President Musa Yar’adua and his deputy, Goodluck Jonathan. 
The amnesty, which was proposed to last for five years, required that 
repentant militants surrendered their arms in return for unconditional 
national pardon. This exercise witnessed a total of 26 808 militants 
surrendering their arms and ammunition and being granted amnesty, 
which involved co-opting or integrating them into the society as well as 
training them (Ajodo-Adebanjoko 2016:1). While amnesty lasted, there 
was some reprieve as militants sheathed their swords. However, there has 
been recourse to arms in the region in recent times as new militant groups 
emerged in 2016 with various demands. While the new names that emerged 
this time differ from the past ones, there is no doubt that this was old wine 
in new bottles. The new militants are still insisting on resource control and 
bombing of oil installations, which is re-immersing the country in conf lict 
once again. The Federal Government in its bid to check this has been 
returning fire for fire by constituting a military operation code-named 
operation ‘Crocodile Smiles’, which the militants and many analysts feel 
is not the answer to the problem of conf lict in the region. This article is an 
attempt to assess the Federal Government’s approach to tackling the new 
wave of militancy in the region. The study proposes a Collective Non-violent 
Conf lict Management approach involving local and foreign negotiators, an 
international mediator and the parties to the conf lict working together to 
find a lasting solution to the conf lict. The choice of this approach is based 
on the fact that many of the strategies (violent and non-violent) adopted 
in the past to resolve conf lict in the region have not achieved the purpose.
Conflicts and insecurity in the Niger Delta 
The Niger Delta region of Nigeria comprises the nine states Abia, Akwa-
Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers. About 
31 million people live in the region which is renowned as one of the World’s 
ten most important wetland and coastal marine ecosystems. The Niger 
Delta is rich with a diverse mosaic of ecological zones, five of which are 
the Mangrove Forest and Coastal Vegetation Zone, the Fresh Water Swamp 
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Forest Zone, the Lowland Rain Forest Zone, the Derived Savannah Zone 
and the Montane Zone. The Niger Delta is also the location of massive 
oil deposits, which have been extracted for decades by the government 
of Nigeria and by Multinational Oil Companies (MNOCs) (Ajodo-
Adebanjoko and Ojua 2013:2). Since 1970, the country has earned at least 
$300 billion from energy development and in 2005 it made $450 billion. 
With about 40 million barrels of proven oil reserves, it currently produces 
2.4 million barrels of oil per day, which constitutes about 90% of the 
government’s revenue and 95% of the country’s foreign exchange earnings 
(Ajodo 2002:6). Nigeria is West Africa’s biggest producer of petroleum and 
the sixth largest supplier of oil in the world, thanks to oil from the Niger 
Delta. Oil wealth has been instrumental to Nigeria’s emergence as a leading 
player in world and regional politics. Specifically, Nigeria has been playing 
a leading and dynamic role in African politics as a member of several 
regional organisations, such as the Africa Union (AU) and the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and an active role in global 
politics under the United Nations. With the oil boom in the early 1970s, 
Nigeria began to assert her inf luence around the globe and to date whatever 
inf luence Nigeria has, is credited to the discovery and exploration of oil.
However, the region which bears this economically important oil has been 
enmeshed in conf licts for more than four decades – owing to the negative 
impact of oil exploration. The region is a tale of poverty, squalor and gross 
underdevelopment in the midst of plenty, due to environmental degradation 
which has affected the people’s agricultural means of livelihood. The effect 
of oil spills and gas f lares has been death to aquatic lives and waste to farm 
lands. It is on record that more gas is f lared in Nigeria than anywhere else 
in the World (Nore and Turner 1980). It is on record that the oil industry 
in the Niger Delta is one of the worst cases in the world of gas f laring. 
Nigeria is the second largest offending country, after Russia, in terms of the 
total volume of gas f lared and the resulting emission of about 70 million 
tons of CO2 a year, higher than the emissions in Norway (Worgu 2000). 
In the case of oil spills, Nigeria has the highest number of oil spills in the 
world; between 9 million and 13 million barrels of oil have been spilled in 
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the Niger Delta (although the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) 
puts the amount of petroleum spilled in the area between 1976 and 1996 at 
1.8 million out of a total of 2.4 million) (Ajodo 2012). A UNDP report 
states that more than 6 800 spills were recorded in the area between 1976 
and 2001 while the Nigeria National Petroleum Company (NNPC) places 
the quantity of petroleum spilled into the environment yearly at 2 300 cubic 
metres, with an average 300 industrial spills annually. The World Bank 
however believes that the amount of oil spills could be ten times higher 
than the officially released figures. Erosion, canalisation, intra- and inter-
communal conf licts between host communities are also some effects of 
oil explorations in the region. This has led to protests by the indigenous 
people, leading in turn to full blown conf licts. 
Conf licts in the Niger Delta have been occurring as far back as the pre-
colonial period and the early 1960s when there were protests against the 
marginalisation of the region. In the early 1990s, there were also non-
violent protests in Ogoniland to protest against the degradation of the 
environment by Oil companies. After these series of uprisings, a new wave 
of protests characterised by militancy began in 2003. Violence during this 
period grew out of the political campaigns in 2003. As they competed for 
office, politicians in Rivers State manipulated the Niger Delta Vigilantes 
(NDV), led by Ateke Tom, and the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force 
(NDPVF), led by Alhaji Asari Dokubo, and used these groups to advance 
their aspirations, often rewarding gang members for acts of political 
violence and intimidation against their opponents (Bekoe 2005). This 
eventually witnessed the emergence of other militant groups, such as the 
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), and the Niger 
Delta Liberation Front (NDLF) which unleashed mayhem on the region. 
This introduced militancy into the region which was characterised by armed 
attacks, bombing of oil installations and hostage taking, particularly of 
foreign oil workers – thereby ushering in a Hobbesian Niger Delta (Ibeanu 
2006:9). For several years, the region was characterised by insecurity; and 
at the height of the crisis, the situation was dreaded by Nigerian citizens 
and foreigners alike. As a result, many people f led their communities and 
many foreign businesses were relocated to their home countries. 
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To address the state of insecurity in the region, the Federal Government in 
2009 proposed an amnesty programme which witnessed a large number of 
militants surrendering their arms in return for training by the government. 
Under the programme, many repentant militants were trained within and 
outside the country and during the period, relative peace returned to the 
region. However, this has been short-lived as there has been the emergence 
of new militant groups such as the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), the Red 
Egbesu Water Lions, Joint Niger Delta Liberation Force (JNDLF), Niger 
Delta Red Squad (NDRS) and the Adaka Boro Avengers in 2016. These new 
groups have continued from where the former militant groups left off with 
renewed bombing of oil installations and abduction of oil workers. Several 
lives have been lost including those of militants and security operatives, 
and insecurity has become the order of the day once again in the Niger 
Delta. Apart from death that has occurred as a result of confrontation with 
the militants, security operations have failed due to the risks involved. 
For instance, in 2016, about four members of the Operation Crocodile 
Smile died when their boat capsized while they were on patrol. There has 
also been destruction of property worth millions of naira. Militancy was 
indeed taking its toll on the Nigerian economy with the country losing over 
N1.8 billion daily due to attacks on oil installations by militants (Okinbaloye 
2016). The government has responded to the attacks by matching force with 
force, a step which analysts have criticised as not helping to achieve the goal 
of enduring peace in the region.
Amnesty represented an opportunity to stabilise the region for constructive 
conflict resolution negotiations. It was not the first time that an amnesty 
initiative had been put forward to resolve the violence in the region, but 
this time it was an offer backed with solid proposals for the necessary 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of the region’s militants 
(Davis 2010). Despite this, however, the programme was not able to address 
regional violence, largely due to the lack of attention to the peculiar type of 
conflict in the Delta and the issues that gave rise to it. Thus, in order to fully 
appreciate the task of conflict resolution there, it is important to look at past 
attempts at conflict resolution in order to consider ideas for the future.
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Theorising conflict in the Niger Delta region
Scholars are unanimous in their views that the end of the Cold War and 
economic globalisation in the 1990s have had a significant impact on 
warfare globally and that the search for appropriate theories to explain 
this has contributed to the growing debate on the importance of natural 
resources as drivers of violent conf licts (Kaldor 1999; Duffield 2001; 
De Soysa 2002:1; Berdal 2003). Empirical studies have also shown that natural 
resources underlie territorial struggles which have been the most prevalent 
form of conf lict all through history (USIP 2007:11; Alao 2007:1). Extant 
literature on conf licts, particularly in Africa, suggests that an overwhelming 
percentage of these conf licts are resource-based (De Soysa 2002; Blench 
2006). According to a recent United Nations report in Sylvester (2012), in 
the last sixty years at least 40% of civil wars on the African continent have 
been connected with natural resources. Even in the natural sciences, there 
is a consensus that competition over scarce natural resources is one of the 
key drivers of violent conf lict within and across species (Bhattacharyya 
2015). Similarly, studies by the World Bank (2003) and others have shown 
that countries whose wealth is largely dependent on the exportation of 
primary commodities (Nigeria, Sudan, Chechnya, Liberia, Indonesia and 
Angola for instance) are highly prone to civil violence, and that those 
with oil and natural gas are the most conf lict prone (Bannon and Collier 
2003:ix). Nigeria is the 12th largest producer of petroleum and its 8th largest 
exporter worldwide. Resource-related conf lict in Nigeria revolves around 
oil with about 95% of violent conf lict in Nigeria since 1997 being resource-
related (Kishi 2014). Studies also found that the fight for resource control 
strengthens the segmentation around already existing ethnic or linguistic 
cleavages thereby escalating conf lict (Gleditsch and Urdal 2002:286; 
Gurr and Harff 1994). Against this background, this work adopts a 
combination of eco-violence and psychological primordial theories.
Eco-violence, also known as environmental conf lict, theory was developed 
by Homer-Dixon (1999:30) in his attempt to explain the causal relationship 
between natural resource endowment and the outbreak of violent conf lict.
16
Angela Ajodo-Adebanjoko
According to him, 
Decrease in the quality and quantity of renewable resources act singly or 
in various combinations to increase the scarcity, for certain population 
groups, of vegetation, farmland, water, forests etc. This scarcity of 
ecological resources can reduce economic productivity, both for the local 
groups experiencing the scarcity and for the larger regional and national 
economies. Consequently, the affected people may migrate or be expelled 
to new lands … while decreases in wealth can cause deprivation conflicts 
(Homer-Dixon 1999:30).
The central argument of the theory is that declining availability of renewable 
natural resources, which results in competition over scarce resources, 
engender violent conf lict (Ajaero et al. 2015:471). This view was expressed 
by Annan (2006) when he stated that ‘environmental degradation in forms 
such as desertification, resource depletion and demographic pressure 
exacerbates tensions and instability ...’. Michael (2001) also noted that: 
Competition over the control of valuable oil supplies and pipeline routes 
has emerged as a particularly acute source of conflict in the 21st century. 
With the demand for oil growing and many older sources of supply (such 
as those in the United States, Mexico, and China) in decline, the pressure 
on remaining supplies, notably those in the Persian Gulf area, the Caspian 
Sea basin, South America, and Africa, is growing ever more intense. 
This is seen from competition in Africa over the revenue generated from 
scarce natural resources which has led to violent conf lict in Angola, 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Sudan and Nigeria 
(Bhattacharyya 2015). The foregoing aptly describes the situation in the 
Niger Delta where oil exploration activities leading to environmental 
degradation such as shortage of farmlands, death of aquatic life, air 
and water pollution, oil poisoning causing respiratory ailments and 
destruction of mangrove forests, often without adequate compensation, 
have resulted in conf lict. This was why the late environmentalist, Ken 
Saro-Wiwa, lamented that the people of the region faced extinction in what 
he described as an ecological war (Saro-Wiwa, cited in Na’Allah 1998). 
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Increasing frustration emanating from oil exploration has led to violent 
resistance which has culminated in conf lict in the region between locals 
represented by militants and oil corporations operating in the region.
Psychological/primordial theorists, on the other hand, are of the view 
that humans have a deep-rooted psychological need to dichotomise and 
to establish enemies and allies, which leads to the formation of ethnic 
and national group identities and behaviours. How a group perceives itself 
and its relationship with those outside the group determines whether their 
relationship will be based on cooperation, competition or conf lict. Usually 
those within the group are regarded as better than those outside, and this 
leads to ‘me-you’, ‘we-they’ ‘insiders-outsiders’ and ‘minority-majority’ 
sentiments. In the Niger Delta, conf licts are generated by grievances 
about natural resources (which border on demands for ownership of the 
resource concerned), the distribution of resource revenues and about 
environmental and social damage caused by extracting the resource. 
In Nigeria, the Federal Government is the one responsible for resource 
allocation and control, but conf lict has arisen over the most appropriate 
revenue sharing formula with the Niger Delta people who demand that 
a special proportion be given to them due to their oil richness – just as 
it was done for the north when agricultural produce was the mainstay 
of the economy (Sheriff et al. 2014:75). This demand has however been 
refused by Nigerians in the rest of the country and by some of the leaders. 
The result was the above-mentioned primordial sentiments of group versus 
group, which led to the creation of ethno-nationalism-identities (Kasomo 
2012:1; Alao 2007:159). We see this in the confrontation between foreign 
oil companies and local communities in the Niger Delta and between the 
Niger Delta people who view themselves as minorities being marginalised 
and oppressed and the ‘majorities’ in the other parts of the country that do 
not produce oil but reap the benefits of revenue allocation. Consequently, 
there have been violent agitations in the form of militancy and a call for 
secession by the Niger Delta buttressing the argument of Bannon and 
Collier (2003:5) that violent secessionist movements are statistically much 
more likely if a country has valuable natural resources, especially oil.
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Efforts by the Nigerian government to address conflicts 
in the Niger Delta
Various efforts, beginning even before independence, have been made by 
the Federal Government to end the conf licts in the region. In 1957, the 
government established the Willink Commission to look into the problems 
of the minorities, and this Commission acknowledged the utter neglect of 
the region and, among other proposals, recommended the creation of the 
Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB). This Board could not achieve 
its aims for many reasons, one of which was the fact that its headquarters 
were located in Lagos, far from the problem area. With the creation of 
twelve states in 1967 and the establishment of the Niger Delta River Basin 
Authority (NDRBA), the NNDB became obsolete. In the second republic, a 
1.5%Federation Account for the development of the Niger Delta region was 
set up for the oil producing areas, but because of the constraint of operating 
from its secretariat in Lagos it was not able to achieve its purpose. 
In spite of recurrent failures, and in order to show its commitment to 
ending the crisis and ensuring the development of the area, the Federal 
Government established some other Commissions such as the Oil Mineral 
Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) which was 
in operation from 1992 to 1999. OMPADEC was set up by the Ibrahim 
Babangida Administration under the chairmanship of Chief Albert 
Horsefall. Like its predecessors, it failed to achieve its mandate owing to 
official prof ligacy, corruption, excessive political interference and lack 
of transparency. After this, the Niger Delta Environmental Survey was 
set up in 1995, followed by the Niger Delta Development Commission, 
established in 2000 by President Olusegun Obasanjo with a vision ‘to offer 
a lasting solution to socio-economic difficulties of the Niger Delta Region’ 
and a mission ‘to facilitate the rapid, even and sustainable development 
of the Niger Delta into a region that is economically prosperous, socially 
stable, ecologically regenerative and politically peaceful’ (Niger Delta 
Development Commission 2000:103). The government also put in place 
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other mechanisms such as the Task Force on Pipeline Vandalisation 
(April 2000) operated by the Nigeria Police Force in collaboration with 
the NNPC (Niger Delta Development Commission 2001). Similar task 
forces were also set up by the navy, army and State Security Service (SSS) 
in various states of the Niger Delta. In Delta state, the government passed 
a law in August 2001 banning militant groups blamed for the disruption of 
oil activities in the state. The Special Security Committee on Oil Producing 
Areas was also set up by the Federal Government in November 2001 to 
address the prevailing situation in the oil producing areas. Other efforts 
include the convening of the first Niger Delta peace conference in Abuja in 
2007, a Joint Task Force (JTF) in 2008, and a Technical Committee made 
up of stakeholders and the Niger Delta ministry in 2008.
Amnesty and post-amnesty era
Following criticisms of the military option, especially when it became 
obvious that the use of force by the JTF was aggravating rather than 
resolving the conf lict, an amnesty programme was set up by the Federal 
Government on 25 May 2009 under the leadership of a former president, 
Umar Musa Yar’Adua. Amnesty was the Federal Government’s effort towards 
bringing enduring peace, security, stability and development to the region. 
It involved granting of national and unconditional pardon to all armed 
militants in the Niger Delta region who in turn were to surrender their 
arms and ammunition, sign an undertaking not to return to the creeks and 
continue with the struggle and also sign the military re-unification forms. 
Amnesty followed the recommendations contained in the 2008 report by 
the Niger Delta Technical Committee (NDTC) initially established by the 
Federal Government, and chaired by MOSOP president Ledum Mitee, 
to assess initiatives taken in the region and provide for a comprehensive 
report and recommendations. The 45-member committee was inaugurated 
on 8 September 2008 to collate and review all past reports in the Niger 
Delta, appraise their recommendations and make other proposals that 
will help the Federal Government achieve sustainable development, peace, 
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human and environmental security in the Niger Delta Region (Mitee 
2009). The amnesty programme included a disarmament, demobilisation 
and reintegration process.
The first stage of the programme led to 26 808 ex-combatants accepting 
the offer. Of them, 20 192 accepted the offer on or before 4th October 2009 
and 6 616 during November 2009 (Ejovi and Ebie 2013). The second stage 
involved government setting up demobilisation camps for the 
demilitarisation and rehabilitation of the ex-militants; while the third stage 
involved government’s engagement with the leadership of the combatants 
and ex-combatants, as well as non-combatant youths, for employment and 
socio-economic empowerment. This therefore brought an end to the spate 
of bombing and kidnappings in the region, and led to an increase in oil 
outputs. Despite this seeming success, amnesty was alleged to be riddled 
with cases of corruption which made it less effective than it should have 
been. As a result, five years after amnesty new militant groups emerged in 
the region, namely; the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), The Joint Niger Delta 
Liberation Force (JNDLF), the Niger Delta Red Squad (NDRS), the Adaka 
Boro Avengers (ABA) and the Niger Delta Greenland Justice Mandate 
(NDGJM). In response, the Federal Government deployed 3 000 military 
personnel to the region with a plan to deploy 10 000 more by the year 2017 
in addition to launching Operation Crocodile Smile aimed at restoring 
peace to the region (Utebor 2016). Criticisms have however followed the 
deployment of troops and particularly the use of force in the region. Critics 
are of the view that the new security measures will further worsen the 
security situation in the region and they therefore called for dialogue. In 
response to this call, the government proposed a $10 billion (N4 trillion) 
infrastructural rebirth investment programme for the region. Leaders and 
stakeholders from the region rejected this, however, on the grounds that they 
were not consulted before it was proposed (Omotayo 2016). In addition, 
the Federal Government in November 2016, convened a peace dialogue in 
which President Buhari met with leaders from the region in Abuja to discuss 
the way forward. At the meeting, leaders of the region led by Edwin Clark 
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presented a 16-point agenda to the Federal Government and although the 
president welcomed the requests in addition to stating that the reports of 
amnesty would be implemented, peace remains elusive. Some critics have 
attributed the rise in militancy to the failure of the 13% derivation principle 
and amnesty to produce development in the region. The result has been 
pressure and a call for ‘resource control’ or ‘fiscal federalism’ (Akintunde 
and Hile 2016).
Recommending the collective non-violent approach to 
conflict management in the Niger Delta
There is no gainsaying that many strategies have been put in place to resolve 
the ongoing imbroglio in the Niger Delta. However, these efforts have failed 
to have the desired effect of ushering in the needed peace. The failure of 
the various strategies is probably due to the fact that they lacked sufficient 
elements of democracy, accountability, equity and active public participation 
of all stakeholders (Ako 2011), which is why Abidde (2009) opined that 
‘peace cannot be dictated; it has to be a natural born child of a just and 
humane environment’. In view of this situation, this article proposes Collective 
Non-violent Conflict Management (CNCM) as an alternative approach. 
This approach is based on collective or cooperative problem solving to 
conflict management. CNCM is a multilateral non-violent and democratic 
approach to conflict resolution involving a team of negotiators, a mediator 
and parties to a dispute working together to find a lasting solution. It is an 
emerging phenomenon in international relations and combines the elements 
of non-violence such as dialogue, negotiation and mediation in resolving 
conflict, building trust and seeking a ‘win-win’ solution (Crocker et al. 
2011:51). Non-violence as an ideology and a practice is not a new approach 
to conflict resolution but has been accepted for decades. It rejects the use 
of violence as a conflict resolution mechanism and serves as a potent force 
for resolving conflict and bringing about social change (Jaspreet 2012:7). 
CNCM as an approach is similar to the Collective Conflict Management 
(CCM) approach of Crocker and others (2011:51), which involves countries, 
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international and regional/sub-regional organisations, and, importantly, 
Non-governmental Organisations or private actors addressing potential or 
actual security threats in a concerted action to:
•	 control, diminish or end violence associated with conf lict through 
combined peace operations and/or mediation, conf lict prevention and 
avoidance;
•	 assist, where appropriate, with a negotiated settlement through 
peacebuilding, cross-border management and other cooperative efforts 
and measures;
•	 help address the political, economic and/or social issues that underlie 
the conf lict; and/or 
•	 provide political, diplomatic and economic guarantees or other long-
term measures to improve local security conditions which involve 
international, regional/sub-regional and local actors and institutions 
supporting negotiation to end a conf lict. 
CNCM is a multilateral arrangement involving all parties in the conf lict 
management process working together with parties to the conf lict to 
find solutions to their problems. Negotiation is facilitated by a mediator 
acceptable to both parties. The mediator is a neutral person and a national 
of another country. The approach is voluntary, informal, improvised 
and adapted to the ad hoc situation; and because of the peculiarity and 
distinctiveness of each region, it is most effective when it occurs within 
regions (Crocker et al. 2011:51). Negotiations should preferably take 
place on neutral ground, for instance in a neighbouring country. In the 
case of the Niger Delta conf lict, Ghana provides an appropriate location 
for negotiations.
The multilateral approach to conf lict resolution has been found to be 
best suited for resolving natural resource conf licts in the 21st century 
(Mwanika 2010:7; Pynn 2011). Multilateral non-violent conf lict resolution 
mechanisms have been successfully used in the Liberia peace process, the 
Philippines–Mindanao talks, the Afghanistan–Pakistan border dispute 
and the Horn of Africa Piracy (Crocker et al. 2011:46–49). 
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Characteristics of the collective non-violent approach
•	 It is usually undertaken by an ad-hoc arrangement or coalition that deals 
with specific security challenges and immediate conf lict management 
needs in the situation concerned.
•	 It is a democratic problem-solving approach that gives parties to a 
conf lict equal opportunity to participate in finding common solutions 
to their problems. It involves communicating face-to-face with one 
another, dialoguing, and negotiating, thereby building trust. This is 
very important in the Niger Delta case as the issue of lack of trust on 
both sides has impeded the process of dialogue.
•	 It is particularly effective when one or more key actors at the official or 
unofficial level are prepared to take the lead and mobilise partners who 
are willing to support a shared undertaking.
•	 It comprises peacebuilding and conf lict transformation processes from 
their inception to their conclusion, including the implementation of 
formal peace settlements which has been lacking in the peace processes 
in the Niger Delta so far.
Challenges of the collective non-violent approach
•	 It needs a supportive environment as parties to the dispute must agree 
to the process and cooperate with the team otherwise it would not 
succeed. Because of the issue of sovereignty, a State may be reluctant 
to adopt an approach that may been seen as foreign interference in its 
domestic politics.
•	 It is expensive as it requires using a neutral location such as another 
country and paying members of the team of negotiators and the mediator. 
•	 It requires members to have the right skills and resources for the success 
of the task at hand and as a result it needs long-term planning, training 
and mobilisation of resources which depend on availability of funds.
•	 It is ineffective where one or more key actors are not prepared to take 




Five years after the declaration of amnesty, there has been a resurgence of 
militancy in the Niger Delta region. Although many claim it is in response 
to the government’s anti-corruption stance, the new wave of militancy 
is worrisome as the region is once again back to the old days of violence 
and insecurity characterised by abductions and vandalism of oil and gas 
pipelines. Conf lict in the region is adversely affecting the Nigerian economy 
at a time when the price of crude oil has plummeted and there are calls 
for diversification of the economy. Furthermore, insecurity in the region 
is compounding an already tense and insecure political climate in the 
country and this is further being heightened by the use of force by federal 
troops. The use of force has never been found to be a solution for problems 
such as those of the Niger Delta and therefore a multilateral non-violent 
approach is recommended. A cooperative approach to resource conf lict 
management is not only necessary for avoiding conf lict and addressing 
social and environmental crises, but it would also salvage significant 
financial resources and foster goodwill among parties to the dispute. 
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